2. you interpret the statement that "the use of computers in elections is dangerous" to mean "only hand-counted paper ballots are safe"
I'd like to let you know you're incorrect about your interpretation of #2, primarily because you (like most others) don't understand what the difference is between electronics and computers. Not pinning that against you as a fault, it's just a common misconception.
I thought I would bring it up since you stated #1.
Logically, what I'm implying should be clear, but I'll make it explicit just so that it's plain. We rely on electronics for national defense, aeronautics, robotics, automotive, mission-critical, and other life-saving systems. We do not rely on computers when they can be avoided.
There is a difference, and much of the effort we are expending right now to push for hand-counted paper ballots will fail (unfortunately) in key, densely populated areas (where it matters). I have been trying to help people sober up to that reality so we don't keep wasting our effort, but rather focus our effort where it can matter.
In my practice (electrical engineering), I estimate 95% of the engineering goes into non-commercial tech. That is - it is not your cell phone or personal computer. Where does all this effort in industry go? It goes into products you never interact with, never think about, would never have a reason to buy, and yet you probably rely on them on the daily for their reliability.
You mention how long you've been talking about election integrity. Like many others, I suspect you'll continue talking about it for a long time, but the success of your narrative depends more or less on how correct it is. If you invest in learning a bit more (not much more) of the tech side, it could help all of your audience.
Feel free to reach out in that regard. I'm not an influencer like you, I just want to speak truth, work, and get my country back.
In the meantime, here's an interview with CannCon from quite a while ago (some of his questions I would respond differently to today.)
Happy to hear more about the distinction you're making, but reading your comment, it sounds like you're making a semantic argument or claiming I used the wrong word. That's fairly irrelevant to me. I do not claim electronics and computers are the same, and obviously they're not. If I used the terms interchangeably, and that's the problem, okay.
As far as voting goes, there's absolutely no reason to introduce voting machines or anything else. It's not necessary and it creates problems without providing any benefits.
I can understand how it sounds like semantics - frankly, I don't even use the word "computer" or "electronics" in my profession because those are poorly defined. The technical terms we use are much more distinct.
Rephrasing, I use "commodity tech" (necessarily must be flexible, necessarily requires software) and "application-specific tech" (necessarily must be reliable, its function is minimal, doesn't change, and therefore uses very little or zero software).
What I am claiming is that application-specific tech is the only way to ensure security and reliability for the myriad of electronics systems we rely upon - whether they comply with industrial standards, automotive standards, military standards, aerospace standards, or biomedical standards - and I am claiming that we could (without a lot of effort) set a new standard for election tech.
This election tech standard (in my mind) REQUIRES paper ballots, ENFORCES one day voting, SECURES against nefarious human activity, etc. My vision aligns with the "real-time tech" that TrueTheVote recommends we update to.
On the other hand, the commodity tech most of the population is familiar with cannot be secured for any one specific application. Blockchain is the best bet, but for reasons I won't get into is unsuitable for our election systems.)
To differentiate the two, think about whether you would want to purchase a new phone just to get a routine security update from Apple or Microsoft. That wouldn't work in consumer tech, but application-specific tech will expect and manage that cost appropriately.
At the end of the day, no system is perfect, not even hand-counted paper ballots. Risk assessment needs to be done, even on hand-counted paper ballot systems. It never has been done, especially since HAVA 2002, and it must be done on every application-specific tech that aims for reliability.
Going back to your comment about "machines" - I have to disagree, but it is because (again) we disagree on definitions. The "hand counted paper ballots" will fail for three reasons, which I'm happy to elaborate upon: 1. definition 2. pragmatism 3. adoption.
What is more important to emphasize, however, is less about how it fails, and more about how using the correct tech actually gives you what you want, even though you don't realize it yet.
I don't deny that machines COULD do the job. Not at all. There's no reason they can't, they just don't. Since the people who put them in place know they don't work (as in, accurately reflect the will of the voters), then you can understand their purpose is to enable cheating. I am certain that responsible, honest, patriotic Americans could design a machine-based system that would do the job, but that's not what we're talking about here.
Hand-marked, hand-counted, verifiable paper ballots (with whatever other additional security) should be the standard, counted on video, with a complete chain-of-custody. I am for the simplest possible system with zero concessions made that could allow for fraud at scale (mail-in ballots, etc).
My point isn't "these machines are bad, therefore all machines are bad". It's "these machines are unnecessary and would increase the opportunities for fraud at best, and the fact that they're bad means that's WHY they're being used". No one would use machines that were bad for everyone and everything. These machines work perfectly, depending on your perspective.
I understand what you're saying, but that's where we disagree (and I disagree with the narrative set by a lot of people with TV time and money.)
Stated directly: I don't believe the election integrity movement will succeed in their stated goals with their stated method. The unwillingness to hear of other methods to achieve your goals - that's the behavior the cheaters used. It's human nature to choose to avoid cognitive dissonance. I keep hoping someone will realize is that our strength is to listen to minority voices.
Again, you're reading from a technical expert, and that's good - but I believe you're misunderstanding what he's saying, the same as many others with money and TV time are.
The proposals I hear to implement a replacement system DO use tech, even when marketed as "paper ballots only", but unfortunately remove the tech further from public oversight. I think that's moving in the wrong direction. That's not the goal we want, and the path we're on with that will lead us off a cliff, learning an even harder lesson of how our efforts are being misdirected (as they always are.)
We could bring the oversight closer to the public, but we are unwittingly choosing not to, not realizing the cliff we're running off.
I understand you want the simplest possible system, my point is that you can't envision what that is if you are not in the area. I can't envision a "best" plumbing or painting, either. I'm not in those fields. But with regard to electronics, I see the proposal you just mentioned as a jumbled, complicated, expensive mess of using off-the-shelf commodity tech that takes oversight further away from the public. We want a trustless system, not a trust-based system.
But we don't need any tech at all. I don't know how I haven't made that clear. I'm more than happy to be a Luddite when it comes to elections. Tech is unnecessary. Small local precincts with livestreamed monitoring can easily do the job. I'm not interested in semantic interpretations of "paper ballots only" or any addition of tech. Tech used to ADD security is fine. We don't need tech to do the job humans can simply and accurately do themselves, and did themselves before the tech existed.
If you want to continue to debate philosophically that we don't need tech, that is up to you. I agree, actually. My point is simply that it will fail in definition, practice, and adoption. That is why I'm concerned with realistic solutions.
Example 1: your stated "counted on video" - which is tech - and while you may think that I'm debating semantics and we don't really need the video, I'm trying to tell you (and others) that one assumption is far more important than you realize. Of the many, many ways video can be tampered with, consider that a video stream can be intercepted (on the camera) and changed in a meaningful way prior to it ever being transmitted off the camera. How would the public oversee that? Then we get into more details about the manufacturer, the parts on the board, the sourcing of those parts, the verification of that system (likely a system-on-chip) and any related software.
Example 2: Will we use paper mail to transmit the vote count totals from precinct to county, from county to State, and from State to the nation? If so, we saw many ways in which the mail was perverted in the 2020 election, Gavin Newsom recall, primaries, and much earlier. Screwing up the mailing system has existed for a long time - for example, in certain precincts and counties not reporting in primaries, cheating certain candidates out of their rightful nomination. This has happened for years, and the general public went on, none the wiser.
We can try to ideate here and now, on-the-spot, how to create countermeasures for this in a pragmatic way. But I'm going to ask you to avoid doing that and just accept I'm not creative enough to come up with these ideas. It's been tried already, and I've just compiled a lot of notes on how it's all failed - that's why I speak with certainty that we won't accomplish these goals the way we are attempting to (e.g. "tech is unnecessary")
And for what it's worth, I hate tech in my personal life. I'm not advocating for tech, necessarily. I'm just saying (even after all these months) that our approach is fundamentally flawed, I've seen this happen in human nature too many times, and we are setting ourselves up for failure rather than success as an election integrity movement. Nothing's perfect, but there are far better approaches we could be using to get to our Luddite elections.
In the same podcast, you state that:
1. you're open to hearing that you are wrong, and
2. you interpret the statement that "the use of computers in elections is dangerous" to mean "only hand-counted paper ballots are safe"
I'd like to let you know you're incorrect about your interpretation of #2, primarily because you (like most others) don't understand what the difference is between electronics and computers. Not pinning that against you as a fault, it's just a common misconception.
I thought I would bring it up since you stated #1.
Logically, what I'm implying should be clear, but I'll make it explicit just so that it's plain. We rely on electronics for national defense, aeronautics, robotics, automotive, mission-critical, and other life-saving systems. We do not rely on computers when they can be avoided.
There is a difference, and much of the effort we are expending right now to push for hand-counted paper ballots will fail (unfortunately) in key, densely populated areas (where it matters). I have been trying to help people sober up to that reality so we don't keep wasting our effort, but rather focus our effort where it can matter.
In my practice (electrical engineering), I estimate 95% of the engineering goes into non-commercial tech. That is - it is not your cell phone or personal computer. Where does all this effort in industry go? It goes into products you never interact with, never think about, would never have a reason to buy, and yet you probably rely on them on the daily for their reliability.
You mention how long you've been talking about election integrity. Like many others, I suspect you'll continue talking about it for a long time, but the success of your narrative depends more or less on how correct it is. If you invest in learning a bit more (not much more) of the tech side, it could help all of your audience.
Feel free to reach out in that regard. I'm not an influencer like you, I just want to speak truth, work, and get my country back.
In the meantime, here's an interview with CannCon from quite a while ago (some of his questions I would respond differently to today.)
https://www.bitchute.com/video/erX3GnbuHRnI/
Happy to hear more about the distinction you're making, but reading your comment, it sounds like you're making a semantic argument or claiming I used the wrong word. That's fairly irrelevant to me. I do not claim electronics and computers are the same, and obviously they're not. If I used the terms interchangeably, and that's the problem, okay.
As far as voting goes, there's absolutely no reason to introduce voting machines or anything else. It's not necessary and it creates problems without providing any benefits.
I can understand how it sounds like semantics - frankly, I don't even use the word "computer" or "electronics" in my profession because those are poorly defined. The technical terms we use are much more distinct.
Rephrasing, I use "commodity tech" (necessarily must be flexible, necessarily requires software) and "application-specific tech" (necessarily must be reliable, its function is minimal, doesn't change, and therefore uses very little or zero software).
What I am claiming is that application-specific tech is the only way to ensure security and reliability for the myriad of electronics systems we rely upon - whether they comply with industrial standards, automotive standards, military standards, aerospace standards, or biomedical standards - and I am claiming that we could (without a lot of effort) set a new standard for election tech.
This election tech standard (in my mind) REQUIRES paper ballots, ENFORCES one day voting, SECURES against nefarious human activity, etc. My vision aligns with the "real-time tech" that TrueTheVote recommends we update to.
On the other hand, the commodity tech most of the population is familiar with cannot be secured for any one specific application. Blockchain is the best bet, but for reasons I won't get into is unsuitable for our election systems.)
To differentiate the two, think about whether you would want to purchase a new phone just to get a routine security update from Apple or Microsoft. That wouldn't work in consumer tech, but application-specific tech will expect and manage that cost appropriately.
At the end of the day, no system is perfect, not even hand-counted paper ballots. Risk assessment needs to be done, even on hand-counted paper ballot systems. It never has been done, especially since HAVA 2002, and it must be done on every application-specific tech that aims for reliability.
Going back to your comment about "machines" - I have to disagree, but it is because (again) we disagree on definitions. The "hand counted paper ballots" will fail for three reasons, which I'm happy to elaborate upon: 1. definition 2. pragmatism 3. adoption.
What is more important to emphasize, however, is less about how it fails, and more about how using the correct tech actually gives you what you want, even though you don't realize it yet.
I don't deny that machines COULD do the job. Not at all. There's no reason they can't, they just don't. Since the people who put them in place know they don't work (as in, accurately reflect the will of the voters), then you can understand their purpose is to enable cheating. I am certain that responsible, honest, patriotic Americans could design a machine-based system that would do the job, but that's not what we're talking about here.
Hand-marked, hand-counted, verifiable paper ballots (with whatever other additional security) should be the standard, counted on video, with a complete chain-of-custody. I am for the simplest possible system with zero concessions made that could allow for fraud at scale (mail-in ballots, etc).
My point isn't "these machines are bad, therefore all machines are bad". It's "these machines are unnecessary and would increase the opportunities for fraud at best, and the fact that they're bad means that's WHY they're being used". No one would use machines that were bad for everyone and everything. These machines work perfectly, depending on your perspective.
I understand what you're saying, but that's where we disagree (and I disagree with the narrative set by a lot of people with TV time and money.)
Stated directly: I don't believe the election integrity movement will succeed in their stated goals with their stated method. The unwillingness to hear of other methods to achieve your goals - that's the behavior the cheaters used. It's human nature to choose to avoid cognitive dissonance. I keep hoping someone will realize is that our strength is to listen to minority voices.
Again, you're reading from a technical expert, and that's good - but I believe you're misunderstanding what he's saying, the same as many others with money and TV time are.
The proposals I hear to implement a replacement system DO use tech, even when marketed as "paper ballots only", but unfortunately remove the tech further from public oversight. I think that's moving in the wrong direction. That's not the goal we want, and the path we're on with that will lead us off a cliff, learning an even harder lesson of how our efforts are being misdirected (as they always are.)
We could bring the oversight closer to the public, but we are unwittingly choosing not to, not realizing the cliff we're running off.
I understand you want the simplest possible system, my point is that you can't envision what that is if you are not in the area. I can't envision a "best" plumbing or painting, either. I'm not in those fields. But with regard to electronics, I see the proposal you just mentioned as a jumbled, complicated, expensive mess of using off-the-shelf commodity tech that takes oversight further away from the public. We want a trustless system, not a trust-based system.
But we don't need any tech at all. I don't know how I haven't made that clear. I'm more than happy to be a Luddite when it comes to elections. Tech is unnecessary. Small local precincts with livestreamed monitoring can easily do the job. I'm not interested in semantic interpretations of "paper ballots only" or any addition of tech. Tech used to ADD security is fine. We don't need tech to do the job humans can simply and accurately do themselves, and did themselves before the tech existed.
If you want to continue to debate philosophically that we don't need tech, that is up to you. I agree, actually. My point is simply that it will fail in definition, practice, and adoption. That is why I'm concerned with realistic solutions.
Example 1: your stated "counted on video" - which is tech - and while you may think that I'm debating semantics and we don't really need the video, I'm trying to tell you (and others) that one assumption is far more important than you realize. Of the many, many ways video can be tampered with, consider that a video stream can be intercepted (on the camera) and changed in a meaningful way prior to it ever being transmitted off the camera. How would the public oversee that? Then we get into more details about the manufacturer, the parts on the board, the sourcing of those parts, the verification of that system (likely a system-on-chip) and any related software.
Example 2: Will we use paper mail to transmit the vote count totals from precinct to county, from county to State, and from State to the nation? If so, we saw many ways in which the mail was perverted in the 2020 election, Gavin Newsom recall, primaries, and much earlier. Screwing up the mailing system has existed for a long time - for example, in certain precincts and counties not reporting in primaries, cheating certain candidates out of their rightful nomination. This has happened for years, and the general public went on, none the wiser.
We can try to ideate here and now, on-the-spot, how to create countermeasures for this in a pragmatic way. But I'm going to ask you to avoid doing that and just accept I'm not creative enough to come up with these ideas. It's been tried already, and I've just compiled a lot of notes on how it's all failed - that's why I speak with certainty that we won't accomplish these goals the way we are attempting to (e.g. "tech is unnecessary")
And for what it's worth, I hate tech in my personal life. I'm not advocating for tech, necessarily. I'm just saying (even after all these months) that our approach is fundamentally flawed, I've seen this happen in human nature too many times, and we are setting ourselves up for failure rather than success as an election integrity movement. Nothing's perfect, but there are far better approaches we could be using to get to our Luddite elections.